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Abstract 
 
This study examines psychological correlates of Jewish-Israeli support for post-conflict 
political reconciliation with Jordan. An analysis of data from a public opinion survey 
conducted with a representative sample of Israeli-Jews (n=1000) indicated that appraisal 
of outgroup collective threat, as well as hatred and (lack of) sympathy towards Jordanians, 
predicted Jewish-Israeli decreased support for peaceful reconciliation with Jordan. Our 
findings point to the crucial role of threat perceptions in hindering post-conflict 
reconciliation and to the importance of sympathy towards the other side in increasing 
support for such reconciliation.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Recent work acknowledges the importance of public support for the ability of leaders 
to implement steps of post-conflict reconciliation (Bar-Tal, 2000). However, scarce 
attention is paid to systematic empirical investigation of the psychological bases of such 
support. This study redresses this omission by examining psychological factors that predict 
Jewish-Israeli public support for reconciliation with Jordan following the signing of a peace 
treaty between the two countries. Post-conflict situations are often characterized by the 
persistence of deeply-set attitudes of animosity towards the other side that can block 
support for peaceful reconciliation. In this study we focus on three indicators of such 
animosity. One is the extent to which citizens perceive their country/entity as being 
threatened by the other side; this will be referred to herein as appraisal of outgroup 
collective threat. The two other components relate to peoples’ intergroup emotions, 
including the extent of hatred and of sympathy citizens feel towards the other side. In this 
study, based on analysis of data collected in a survey of Jewish-Israeli public opinion 
(n=1000), we examine whether attitudes of animosity still persist in the post-conflict 
situation between Israelis and Jordanians and the extent to which these attitudes function as 
psychological barriers to public support for peaceful reconciliation between the two 
countries.  
 
 
Scientific Background 
 
Resolving protracted conflicts is a complex, time-consuming challenge. Even when 
mutual agreements are signed, the resulting post-conflict situations still require a long and 
gradual reconciliation process in which the parties build cooperative relations and a stable 
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peace between them (Bar-On, 2008; Bar-Tal, 2001; Kelman, 1999; Lederach, 1998). The 
examples of peace making in Northern Ireland (Arthur, 1999) and the South African Truth 
and reconciliation process (Hamber, 1998) demonstrate that signing official agreements 
between leaders is not enough. These have to be accompanied by dynamics of social, 
psychological and structural change at the both at the level of policy-makers and the public 
on both sides so that stable peace can be reached (Bar-On, 1997; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004). 
Unless the general public in each country support reconciliation, peace remains tentative 
and unstable (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004).  
Lederach (1998) has noted that the reconciliation process requires implementation of 
formal policies that forge relations between former rivals, create cooperative links and 
stabilize peaceful relationships. These steps towards political reconciliation include 
developing joint institutions and organizations, free and open trade, joint economic 
ventures, and free and open tourism, as well as exchanging cultural products and 
information in various areas. However, such policies often seem difficult to achieve in the 
aftermath of protracted ethnic conflict. The difficulties are not only related to the lack of 
agreement or cooperation between policymakers, but are also to the lack of public support 
on each side for embarking on a route of cooperation with the other side.  
Threat appraisal has been identified as an important factor determining policy 
preferences in situations of conflict or increased intergroup tension and violence. Societies 
involved in intractable conflicts are dominated by an orientation towards threat (Bar-Tal, 
2001). Whilst an orientation of threat may be functional for coping with the stressful, 
highly uncertain and demanding situation of warfare, when it is maintained in post-conflict 
situations, it serves as a barrier to progress in the peace process via reconciliation and 
cooperation with the other side (Kelman, 1999).  
As in similar intractable conflicts to the ongoing Israeli-Arab conflict, orientations of 
outgroup threat are a dominant force in maintaining and escalating the conflict. In the 
Israeli-Palestinian context, Jewish-Israeli outgroup threat perception was found to be 
associated with less conciliatory and less compromising positions towards Palestinians 
(Bar-Tal, 2001). Nevertheless, intergroup emotions of hatred and sympathy have also been 
found to contribute (to a smaller but still independent degree) to the willingness of citizens 
to make compromises (Maoz and McCauley, 2005).  
There are other studies that also emphasize the importance of dealing with emotions 
in attempts at conflict resolution. This literature describes how negative and widely shared 
emotions towards the other side that are usually dominant in societies involved in conflict 
(such as anger, fear and hatred) can also remain dominant in post-conflict situations and 
thus become a barrier to reconciliation and cooperation (Bar-On, 1997, 2008; Bar-Tal, 
2001, 2007; Staub, 1990). On the other hand, equally crucial is the development of positive 
emotions in post-conflict situations, such as hope (Bar-Tal, 2001), caring, sensitivity and 
empathy to the members of the other group (Bar-On, 2008; Kelman, 1999). Positive 
emotional orientations towards the other side are described as necessary for achieving and 
maintaining reconciliation and cooperation between former enemies (Kelman, 1999). 
In this study we intend to expand this line of research and look at how well these 
psychological variables empirically explain public attitudes towards reconciliation during 
the more advanced stages of a peace process. Understanding the psychological 
underpinnings of support for reconciliation may be even more important after a formal 
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agreement has been signed (Kelman, 1999). Once some of the more objective reasons for 
hostility have been removed, leaders need to place a greater emphasis on attitudinal 
barriers.  
 
 
Jordan and Israel  
 
The signing of the Israel-Jordan peace accord in 1994 represented a significant 
breakthrough in the ongoing Middle East conflict. Israelis have traditionally harbored 
considerably less hostility towards Jordan than towards the Palestinians. King Hussein was 
considered a relatively moderate Arab leader by most Israelis and the two countries often 
carried out clandestine forms of cooperation long before they were engaged in a formal 
peace process. Jordan’s willingness to come to a formal agreement with Israel was directly 
related to the early stages of the Oslo peace process when it seemed that peace might also 
be achieved with the Palestinians.  
There was a great deal of optimism in the air when the treaty itself was signed at a 
ceremony attended by Prime Minister Rabin, King Hussein, and President Clinton. It is 
interesting that the wording of the treaty refers specifically to the need to address the 
subjective sources of hostility among the two publics: “Bearing in mind the importance of 
maintaining and strengthening peace based on freedom, equality, justice and respect for 
fundamental human rights, thereby overcoming psychological barriers and promoting 
human dignity”; “Desiring to develop friendly relations and co-operation between them in 
accordance with the principles of international law governing international relations in time 
of peace” (Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan, October 26, 1994).  
Unfortunately, the Oslo peace process ended in failure and this had a major impact on 
the relations between the two countries (Scham and Lucas, 1998; Wolfsfeld, 2002). After 
the eruption of the second Intifada, Jordan recalled its ambassador for several years and 
relations remain strained. Nevertheless, the leaders of both countries have since continued 
to attempt to maintain and even advance the peace and peace building practices between the 
sides. 
 
 
Dynamics of Asymmetric Threat 
 
Several studies have examined Jordanian attitudes towards Israel and towards 
normalization and reconciliation with it and have found, in most cases, that these attitudes 
are quite negative (Kornbluth, 2002; Scham and Lucas, 1998). It is important to point out, 
however, that the level of hostility in Israel towards Jordan was not perceived to be as acute 
as the degree of animosity felt in Jordan towards Israel. The Israeli elites and general 
publics have, some argue, been generally more supportive of “normalizing” relations 
between the two countries than their Jordanian counterparts (Scham and Lucas, 1998; 
Wolfsfeld, Alimi and Kaliani, 2008). A major reason for this difference is the asymmetrical 
strategic balance between the two countries: Jordan does not represent a serious security 
threat to Israel, but many (if not most) Jordanians consider Israel a serious threat to the 
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region. Once the peace treaty was signed and the Israeli need for recognition and security 
were addressed, Jordan was not considered a threat by most Israelis. This is not the case for 
Jordan, which has experienced severe economic and security issues since the signing of the 
peace treaty in 1994, especially following the collapse of the Oslo process and the 
reemergence of Israeli-Palestinian violence in September 2000 (Wolfsfeld et al., 2008).  
Little research attention has been dedicated, however, to studying, in this context of 
asymmetrical strategic relations, the attitudes of Israeli-Jews towards Jordan. The aim of 
our study is to fill this gap and to investigate Jewish-Israeli attitudes towards Jordanians 
and examine the effect of these attitudes on Jewish-Israeli support for post-conflict 
reconciliation with Jordan.  
 
 
Intergroup Attitudes: Threat Appraisal and Emotions  
 
The research will focus on two types of intergroup attitudes that are expected to 
predict a willingness for peaceful reconciliation, i.e. appraisal of outgroup collective threat 
and intergroup emotions. This distinction is important because the appraisal of outgroup 
collective threat can be seen, to some extent, as a more cognitive or analytical type of 
construct. It is a more “macro” construct that mostly refers to peoples’ assessments of how 
much their country/entity is under threat from the outgroup, both in terms of the outgroup’s 
perceived destructive intentions towards one’s own group and in terms of the outgroup’s 
perceived ability to cause serious damage. Intergroup emotions, on the other hand, focus 
more at the level of how people feel towards the outgroup, including both negative 
emotions (such as hate and anger) and positive ones (such as sympathy).  
We are not suggesting, of course, that it is possible to completely separate an 
individual’s appraisal of collective outgroup threat from his/her personal feelings. Indeed, 
the level of hatred one feels towards the outgroup is very likely to be related to one’s 
appraisal of collective threat from the outgroup. It is nevertheless worthwhile to make this 
distinction because negative emotions towards a former enemy are likely to continue long 
after any serious outgroup threat has been removed. In addition, the path for reducing a 
sense of collective threat from the outgroup may run in a very different direction from the 
path towards reducing negative emotions (or increasing positive emotions) towards the 
other side.  
We adopt in this research a relatively broad approach to the notion of appraisal of 
outgroup collective threat that relates specifically to Jordanian threat but also to the more 
general Israeli perception of threat from all Arab countries and entities. Our assumption 
was that, in addition to the appraisal of specific collective threat from Jordan, the general 
appraisal of Arab collective threat to Israel was likely to affect respondents’ overall 
willingness to support reconciliation with Jordan. Hence, we used in this study two 
measures of Jewish-Israeli appraisal of outgroup collective threat: (1) appraisal of 
Jordanian Collective Threat – relating to specific threat from Jordan, and (2) appraisal of 
Arab Collective Threat (relating to the more general perception of Arab countries and 
entities posing a threat to Israel and including items such as: “I am concerned that in the 
coming years, Arab terror against Israel will only further increase”).  
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This study also focuses on two categories of intergroup emotions: hatred and 
sympathy. Feeling of hatred towards former enemies is probably the easiest emotion to 
understand in a conflict context, not least because it is so basic and personal. The notion of 
sympathy, on the other hand, is somewhat more complex, for it refers to one’s ability to 
understand the other side while being positively oriented towards it. This variable might be 
especially important to examine when looking at an asymmetrical set of relations such as 
those that exist between Israel and Jordan. In this context of post-conflict relations, it is 
important to determine the extent to which Israeli-Jews feel sympathy towards Jordanians.  
 
 
Jewish-Israeli Post-Conflict Animosity toward Jordan  
 
Appraisal of outgroup collective threat, hatred towards the outgroup and sympathy 
toward it all relate to the level of animosity people hold towards the other side. Appraisal of 
high collective threat from the outgroup, together with high hatred and low sympathy 
towards the outgroup, indicate a high level of animosity towards this outgroup. Appraisal of 
low collective threat from the outgroup, together with low hatred and high sympathy 
towards this outgroup, indicate a low level of animosity towards the outgroup. Between 
these two extremes there are several combinations that indicate intermediate animosity. 
While high animosity towards the outgroup clearly exists in conflict situations and has been 
shown to predict (decreased) readiness for conflict resolution, the extent and effect of 
animosity in post-conflict situations are less clear. Post-conflict situations often signify a 
change on the political and formal level, but not necessarily a transformation in the deeper 
societal–psychological level of deeply-set negative beliefs and emotions towards the other 
side (Kelman, 1999). The other side tends to still be seen as threatening to some extent, and 
is hated and not sympathized with, even after peace agreements have been reached. This 
may constitute a major barrier to people’s readiness for reconciliation.  
Given the history of the conflict between Israel and the Arab world and the past 
rivalry with Jordan we assumed that Israeli-Jews would still hold, to some extent, attitudes 
of animosity towards Jordan and expected that these attitudes would influence the readiness 
of Israeli-Jews for peaceful reconciliation with Jordan. 
 
 
Predicting Support for Peaceful Reconciliation  
 
Support for peaceful reconciliation requires a deep and significant actual 
psychological and societal change that includes not only normalization in different domains 
(such as economics, security, etc.), but also a deeper transformation of the former relations 
of conflict, hatred and distrust to becoming relations of cooperation and trust (Lederach, 
1998). Support for such change may be strongly hindered by perceptions and feelings of 
animosity towards the other side that often still powerfully persist even after the phase of 
acute conflict has formally ended (Bar-Tal, 2001). Thus, it can be expected that the three 
components of animosity will each significantly contribute to explaining decreased Jewish-
Israeli support for peaceful reconciliation in the post-conflict situation with Jordan.  
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Overview of Study 
 
The aim of our study was to explore psychological correlates of public support for 
reconciliation focusing on Jewish-Israeli public opinion regarding Israeli-Jordanian 
relations. Thus the criterion measures for our study assessed Jewish-Israeli support for a 
number of specific policies of Israeli-Jordanian reconciliation. These included items about 
open borders between Israel and Jordan, the creation of joint economic institutions, and 
anti-incitement policies. As predictors of support for political reconciliation we included 
three measures of the extent of Jewish-Israeli attitudes of animosity towards Jordan: a 
measure of appraisal of Arab collective threat, a measure of appraisal of Jordanian 
collective threat, and measures of Jewish-Israeli hatred and sympathy towards Jordanians. 
We also included demographic measures.  
 
 
Method 
 
Telephone interviews (n = 1000) were conducted by the Machshov Research Institute 
with a representative sample of adult Israeli-Jews in May 2004. The survey included one 
set of items measuring the respondents’ attitudes toward various reconciliation policies in 
Israeli-Jordanian relations and another set of items that assessed the respondents’ feelings 
toward and beliefs about Jordanians and about Arabs. In addition, demographic information 
was obtained. The questionnaire was administered in Hebrew. The items analyzed in this 
study are described in more detail below.  
 
 
Support for Reconciliation 
 
Support for political reconciliation with Jordan was measured by a “Support for 
Reconciliation Scale”. This scale was adapted to the Israeli-Jordanian context from a 
similar scale constructed by Shamir and Shikaki (2002) in the context of Israeli-Palestinian 
relations. Items in this scale describe a range of steps, often mentioned in reconciliation 
literature as prerequisites for successful reconciliation following protracted conflicts 
(Lederach, 1998). The steps include normalization measures such as open borders, 
economic cooperation, and political cooperation, and transformative steps intended to 
change the national ethos, such as fundamental modifications in the school curriculum 
(Shamir and Shikaki, 2002). The Reconciliation Scale used in our study concentrates on the 
policy level and thus includes an adaptation of the four items that measure attitudes towards 
formal policies of reconciliation from the Shamir and Shikaki (2002) scale. Specifically, the 
scale used in our study included the five following reconciliation measures items: “Open 
Borders between Israel and Jordan so there will be a free passage of people and 
merchandise”, “Create joint economic institutions and joint economic ventures”, “Create 
joint political institutions”, “Introduce into the school curriculum the notion of giving up 
the aspirations to appropriate parts of the ‘homeland’ that are under Palestinian control”, 
and “Take legal measures against those expressing incitement towards Jordan”. 
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Respondents were asked to rate support of each item on a 4-point bipolar scale ranging 
from “strongly object” (1) to “strongly support” (4). 
 
 
Psychological Predictors: Intergroup Attitudes of Animosity  
 
Our indicators of the level of animosity towards Jordan included two measures of 
appraisal of out group collective threat (“Appraisal of Arab Collective Threat Scale” and 
“Appraisal of Jordanian Collective Threat Scale) and two measures of emotions towards 
Jordanians (“Hatred towards Jordanians Scale” and “Sympathy towards Jordanians Scale”) 
that were derived from Maoz and McCauley (2005), and adapted to the Jordanian post-
conflict context. Each of these measures was compromised of several items that were rated 
on a 5-point bi-polar scale ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5). 
However, different labels appeared in the second item in the Appraisal of Jordanian Threat 
Scale (see below). Responses to these items were averaged for each respondent to form the 
scales, where higher scores mean higher agreement with the designated intergroup attitude. 
Below we describe the different measures in more detail.  
 
 
Appraisal of Outgroup Collective Threat   
 
Appraisal of outgroup collective threat appraisal was assessed by two measures: (1) 
the “Appraisal of Arab Collective Threat Scale” that included the items: “I am concerned 
that in the coming years, Arab terror against Israel will only further increase” “Arabs 
understand only the language of power” “Peace is important to Arabs as it is to Jews” 
(reversed); “and “Arabs hate Jews”. (2) The “Appraisal of Jordanian Collective Threat 
Scale” that included the items: “If a war will break out between Israel and the Arab states, 
Jordan will also join the war”; “To which direction, in your opinion, will Israeli-Jordanian 
relations proceed in the coming years?” (1= get much better, 2= get better, 3= stay as they 
are, 4= get worse, 5= get much worse).  
 
 
Emotions towards Jordanians 
 
Emotions towards Jordanians were assessed by two scales. The “Hatred Scale” (1) 
included the items: “I feel hate towards Jordanians” and “I feel anger toward Jordanians”. 
The “Sympathy Scale” (2) included the items: “I feel liking toward Jordanians”, and “I feel 
understanding toward Jordanians”. Table 2 (at end of article) presents the Cronbach alphas, 
means and standard deviations of each of the above scales as well as their inter-
correlations. 
 
 
Demographic Questions 
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In addition, respondents were also presented with demographic questions. These 
included questions about gender and age of the respondent, degree of religiosity, number of 
years of education and economic status (level of family monthly expenditures).  
 
 
Results 
 
Our results section includes three parts. First, we present the descriptive data 
regarding Jewish-Israeli support for reconciliation with Jordan. Second, we describe our 
findings regarding the extent of Jewish-Israeli post-conflict attitudes of animosity towards 
Jordan. Finally, we present the regression model predicting Jewish-Israeli support for 
peaceful reconciliation with Jordan.  
 
 
Support for the Different Reconciliation Policies  
Means and standard deviations of support for the reconciliation items appear in Table 
1 (at end of article). The item that Israeli-Jews view as the most acceptable is “Joint 
Economic Institutions” (M = 2.98 and percentage of support: 77.4 %). The least acceptable 
items are “Joint Political Institutions” and “Curriculum Change” (M’s = 2.54 and 2.33 
respectively, percentages of support: 54.4% and 44% respectively). In between these two 
poles we find the “Open Borders” and “Legal Measures against Incitement” items (M’s: 
2.65 and 2.68 respectively, percentage of support: 61% and 60% respectively). It is 
interesting though not surprising to see that the two items that meet the highest resistance 
are the ones that require the most meaningful change. Joint political institutions require 
political cooperation that is probably considered as involving a more significant structural 
change than economic cooperation. Curriculum change requires a deep transformation of 
attitudes and aspirations that are a focal part of the Jewish-Israeli national ethos (Bar-Tal, 
2000), regarding the right of Jews to the “Greater land of Israel” (Eretz Israel Hashlema).  
 
 
The Support for Reconciliation Scale 
 
A scale was created of these five items (M = 2.64; SD = .68, Alpha Cronbach = .78). 
The inter-correlations of these items ranged from .25 to .57 the median inter-item 
correlation being .43. Responses to these items were averaged for each respondent to form 
the Support for Reconciliation Scale, in which higher scores mean higher support for 
reconciliation (see Table 1, end of article).  
 
 
Post-conflict Attitudes of Animosity 
 
Means and standard deviations of ratings of animosity attitudes appear in Table 2. 
These data indicate that in the post-conflict situation Israeli-Jews hold mostly low attitudes 
of animosity towards Jordanians and thus appraise Jordanian collective threat as low (M = 
2.65) and express very low hatred towards Jordanians (M = 1.67). However, Israeli-Jews 
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also indicated low sympathy towards Jordanians (M = 2.38). Jewish-Israeli general 
appraisal of “Arab threat” was found to be higher than their appraisal of Jordanian threat, 
but was still quite low (M = 3.59). How do these Jewish-Israeli attitudes of low appraisal of 
outgroup collective threat, low hatred but also low sympathy towards Jordanians influence 
support for political reconciliation with Jordan? The next section presents our findings 
regarding this question (see Table 2, end of article). 
 
 
Predicting Support for Reconciliation 
 
The regression model using the psychological measures of animosity attitudes to 
predict the Support for Reconciliation Scale produced a statistically significant R2 = .27, F 
(4, 995) = 92.9, p < .001. Appraisal of Arab Collective Threat was the strongest predictor of 
Support for Reconciliation (β = -.30, p = .001). Thus, respondents with lower scores on this 
measure, showed a significantly increased support for reconciliation, R2= .18, F (1, 998) = 
218.9, p < .001. The measures of feelings towards Jordanians each made an independent, 
added, lower but significant contribution to predicting support for reconciliation. Thus, 
respondents with lower scores on the Hatred Scale (β = -.19, p < .001), and higher scores on 
the Sympathy Scale (β = .18, p < .001) showed increased support for reconciliation with a 
significant R2 change for the addition of the Hatred scale predictor over appraisal of Arab 
Collective Threat, R2 change = .04, F (1,997)= 52.9, p < .001, and a significant R2 change 
for the addition of the Sympathy Scale over the Appraisal of Arab Collective Threat Scale 
and the Hatred Scale, R2 change = .04, F (1, 996) = 52.7, p < .001. The weakest (but still 
significant) predictor was Appraisal of Jordanian Collective Threat. Respondents with 
lower scores on this measure, (β = -.11, p < .001) showed increased support for political 
reconciliation with a significant R2 change for its addition over the three other measures, R2 
change = .01, F (1,995) = 15.9, p < .001.  
Thus, in line with our hypothesis the results indicate that attitudes of animosity 
towards the Jordanians: Appraisal of outgroup collective threat, hatred and (low) sympathy 
towards Jordanians significantly predict decreased Jewish-Israeli support for peaceful 
reconciliation with Jordan, with each of these measures providing an independent 
significant contribution to the prediction. Interestingly, the appraisal of specific threat from 
Jordan itself produced the lowest contribution to the prediction. Possible explanations for 
this finding will be presented in the discussion section.  
 
 
Demographic Measures and Support for Political Reconciliation  
 
The addition of demographic variables to our prediction model indicated that most of 
these measures (i.e. religiosity, ethnicity, gender and level of education), did not have any 
significant contribution to our prediction of support for peaceful reconciliation. The only 
significant demographic predictors found were age (β = .09, p = .001) and level of expenses 
(β = .06, p = .03) with higher figure on each associated with higher support for 
reconciliation.  
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Discussion 
 
Recent research and theorizing in the domain of conflict and conflict resolution 
emphasizes that formal peace agreements between societies in protracted conflict are not 
enough for establishing stable and lasting peace (Lederach, 1998). 
Formal conflict resolution sometimes involves only the leaders who negotiated the 
agreement or narrow strata around them. In these cases, the majority of society members 
may not accept the negotiated compromises, or even if they do, may still hold world views 
that have fueled the conflict. As a result, formal resolutions of conflicts may be unstable. 
They may collapse as in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or turn into cold peace 
as in the case of Israeli-Jordanian relations. In these cases past conflictive relations have not 
turned into peaceful relations of reconciliation and cooperation that involve, and are 
supported by, wide sectors of publics on both sides (Bar-Tal, 2000).  
Though public support is recognized as crucial in reaching peaceful reconciliation, 
very few studies have tried to directly and systematically examine factors that influence 
such support. One such study done by Shamir and Shikaki (2002) focused on the role of 
expectations for lasting peace and democracy in Israeli and Palestinian public opinion in 
support of reconciliation and compromise. Another study by Maoz and McCauley (2005) 
examined psychological bases of Jewish-Israeli public opinion support for compromise 
with Palestinians. Here, we expand upon these studies by examining psychological 
predictors of post-conflict support for reconciliation. Specifically, we attempt to learn more 
about the extent to which intergroup attitudes of animosity (such as appraisal of outgroup 
collective threat as well as hatred and [low] sympathy towards the outgroup) predict 
decreased Jewish-Israeli support toward reconciliation and cooperation policies in Israeli-
Jordanian post-conflict relations. But before discussing our prediction model and its 
findings, we will discuss two other essential questions that this study dealt with. One is the 
extent of Jewish-Israeli post-conflict public support for political reconciliation with Jordan 
and the other is the extent to which Jewish-Israeli attitudes of animosity towards Jordan 
still persist, even after the signing of the peace treaty between the two countries.  
 
 
Jewish-Israeli Support for Reconciliation with Jordan 
 
Our findings indicate that the majority of the Jewish-Israeli public support the 
implementation of reconciliation policy measures with Jordan (around 60% support for 
most of the measures examined). This is consistent with the results of public opinion 
surveys conducted on the Jewish-Israeli population directly after the signing of the peace 
accords on November and December 1994 (Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, 1994). 
These surveys also found high support for Israeli-Jordanian peace. Together these results 
may indicate that Israeli public attitudes towards peace with Jordan are stable and relatively 
positive. This contrasts with Jordanian attitudes towards peace and normalization with 
Israel, which some have found to be consistently more negative since the signing of the 
peace treaty (Kornbluth, 2002; Scham and Lucas, 1998). 
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Israeli Post-conflict Attitudes towards Jordan  
 
Deeply-set hostile perceptions and emotions towards the other side have been 
described as persisting in post-conflict situations and as hindering the attainment of full and 
stable peace (Bar-On, 1997, 2008). Our study empirically demonstrates the sustenance of 
such attitudes among the Israeli-Jewish population in the post-conflict relations with 
Jordan. Though the specific appraisal of collective threat from Jordan was found as low, 
another important component of appraisal of outgroup collective threat – the appraisal of 
the more general Arab collective threat – remained higher (notably the change in the 
relations with Jordan did not include a change in the broader context of the Israeli-Arab 
conflict). As could be expected in the current phase of formal peace between the two 
countries, Jewish-Israeli hatred towards Jordanians was found to be very low. However, 
Israeli-Jordanian peace might be described as an extremely “cold” (almost frozen) peace, as 
the extent of Israeli sympathy towards Jordanians was found to be low despite the lack of 
perceived threat. Together, these findings paint a picture of slightly negative-leaning Israeli 
indifference towards Jordanians. Thus, Israeli Jews do not perceive Jordanians as highly 
threatening, nor are do they feel high hatred towards Jordanians, but neither do they feel 
much sympathy towards them.  
This makeup of attitudes can be understood as characterizing the asymmetrical post-
conflict relations of the stronger Israel with its past enemy Jordan, which holds a very low 
strategic threat potential. The low perceived specific threat from Jordan itself to Israel gives 
little reason to hate or feel anger towards Jordanians. However, as Jordanians are former 
enemies and also part of the Arab world (and thus also part of the still active Israeli-Arab 
conflict) positive attitudes towards them remain underdeveloped and generally weak.  
How do these Jewish-Israeli attitudes of appraisal of low collective threat and low 
hatred but also low sympathy towards Jordan influence Jewish-Israeli willingness for 
transforming the relations between the two countries towards policies of normalization and 
reconciliation? Our findings in regard to this issue are discussed in the next section.  
 
 
Appraisal of Outgroup Collective Threat, Hatred and Sympathy as Predictors of Support 
for Reconciliation  
 
In line with our expectations, we found that attitudes of animosity towards Jordan – 
appraisal of outgroup collective, hatred and (low) sympathy – significantly predict 
decreased readiness for peaceful reconciliation with Jordan, with each measure having an 
independent contribution to this prediction. Appraisal of outgroup (Arab) collective threat 
was the strongest single predictor of for the extent of support for reconciliation, with the 
hatred and sympathy scales each adding a smaller significant contribution. Interestingly, 
our findings indicate that appraisal of Jordanian collective threat made the smallest (but still 
significant) contribution to the prediction of Jewish-Israeli attitudes towards reconciliation 
with Jordan. Demographic variables of age and level of expenses added a small 
contribution to this prediction.  
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Taken together, our findings emphasize the importance of psychological attitudes, 
and specifically the role of cognitive threat appraisal together with intergroup emotion 
variables, as major factors in explaining support for reconciliation. Importantly, our study 
demonstrates that feelings such as sympathy towards the other side have a significant role 
in predicting increased support for peaceful reconciliation in situations of post-conflict. 
Nevertheless, although feelings towards Jordanians do contribute to predicting support for 
reconciliation with Jordan, appraisal of outgroup collective threat (and in our case appraisal 
of Arab collective threat) was still found to be the strongest single predictor of the extent of 
such support.  
 
 
Threat Appraisal and Support for Reconciliation  
 
Post-conflict situations have been described as characterized by “a carry over” of 
perceptions of threat that were relevant during the conflict but nevertheless continue to 
have a decisive impact on public attitudes after peace agreements have been signed (Bar-
Tal, 2000; Bar-On, 1997, 2008). Our study empirically demonstrates this “carry over” 
effect in which appraisal of collective threat from the outgroup – and more specifically, 
appraisal of Arab collective threat – continues to be a dominant factor in the post-conflict 
situation of Israeli-Jordanian relations, and importantly determines public support for 
peaceful reconciliation with Jordan.  
Israeli-Jewish threat orientation towards Arabs has persisted for generations and plays 
a major role in policy preferences in conflict and peace processes. Teichman and Bar-Tal 
(2005) conducted an extensive analysis of Arabs’ representation in Israeli political, social, 
educational, cultural and media channels through 100 years of conflict. These authors found 
that portrayals of Arabs as threatening have became part of the Jewish-Israeli ethos of 
conflict and this leads to a continued threat orientation of the Israeli public. Wolfsfeld 
(2002, 2004) demonstrates, via the most extensive and systematic studies done on the 
Israeli news media in conflict and peace, how these media provide an ethnocentric 
presentation of the Israeli–Arab conflict in which Arab and Palestinian destructive 
intentions and threat towards Israel are highly emphasized.  
Thus, it may be in the context of the asymmetric post-conflict relations between Israel 
and Jordan that, as Jordan is not perceived by Israelis as specifically or realistically 
threatening (Appraisal of Jordanian Collective Threat M = 2.65), Jordanian threat makes 
only a small contribution to predicting support for reconciliation with Jordan. However, 
Israeli-Jews perceive a much higher threat from Arabs (Appraisal of Arab Collective Threat 
M = 3.59). This appraisal of Arab collective threat is significantly associated with 
respondents’ lower support for peaceful reconciliation with Jordan (see also Wolfsfeld et 
al., 2002 for similar observations about Israeli perception of low Jordanian threat in 
contrast to perception of higher threat from other Arab entities). Our findings may indicate 
that, despite the post-conflict situation, Jordan is still to an extent perceived by the Israeli 
public to be part of the hostile and threatening Arab world, and thus appraisal of Arab 
collective threat constitutes a major barrier to reconciliation with Jordan.  
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Conclusion 
 
Our study empirically examined the psychological correlates of Jewish-Israeli 
attitudes toward peaceful reconciliation in the post-conflict Israeli-Jordanian relations. 
Public support for formal reconciliation policies with Jordan was found to be significantly 
predicted by our psychological measures of animosity towards Jordanians and negatively 
correlated with appraisal of outgroup collective threat, hatred and (low) sympathy towards 
Jordanians.  
  Generally, our findings indicate that appraisal of outgroup collective threat 
constitutes a major barrier to conflict resolution and peaceful reconciliation. This is 
consistent with findings of previous studies (Bar-On, 2008; Bar-Tal, 2001). However, the 
fact that appraisal of collective Arab threat (and not the appraisal of Jordanian collective 
threat) was found in our study to be a major barrier to reconciliation with Jordan clearly 
shows that the asymmetric post-conflict dynamics between Israel and Jordan cannot be 
detached from the wider context of the Israeli-Arab conflict (in which this asymmetry 
disappears or is even reversed). The more general appraisal of Arab collective threat to 
Israel still powerfully hinders Israeli readiness for peaceful reconciliation even in cases, 
such as with Jordan, where formal peace agreements have been reached.  
Another interesting finding of this study concerns the role of sympathy in Israeli-
Jordanian post-conflict relations. As perhaps could be expected, Israeli-Jews still feel some 
(but very low) hatred towards Jordanians and this constitutes a significant barrier to their 
support for reconciliation with this country. However, less expected in this context of 
formal peace is the low sympathy Israeli-Jews feel towards Jordanians The importance of 
this result is even further emphasized when we consider that this feeling of low sympathy 
towards Jordanians is a barrier to Jewish-Israeli reconciliation support (β= .15) that is as 
strong as the feeling of hatred towards Jordanians (β= -.15). While sympathy towards 
others is usually seen as a “soft” variable, i.e. linked to dialogues and interpersonal 
emotions, our findings indicate that this variable also has an important role at the policy 
level as it significantly and independently predicts support for reconciliation.  
The moral exclusion model, developed by the social psychologist Susan Opotow, 
describes a process in which people are placed “outside the boundary in which moral 
values, rules and considerations of fairness apply” (1990, p. 1). Causing or allowing harm 
to those outside of one’s moral community is justified and rationalized on the premise that 
they are expendable, undeserving, exploitable, and irrelevant (Opotow, 1990). Especially in 
asymmetric conflict, moral exclusion may lead to the use of aggression towards the weaker, 
morally excluded group (Staub, 1990). In the context of the asymmetric, post-conflict 
relations between Israel and Jordan, the Jewish-Israeli lack of sympathy towards Jordanians 
may reflect a deeper, underlying process of moral exclusion that constitutes a barrier to the 
willingness to reconcile with Jordan and may even facilitate, in certain cases, intergroup 
aggression.  
Given the important moral and political implications of intergroup sympathy, it 
would be interesting to examine in further research the factors that influence the level of 
sympathy towards the other side in conflict and post-conflict situations.  
In the specific context of Israeli-Jordanian relations, it seems that the cold peace 
between the two countries has turned into “frozen peace” that may also freeze advances 
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towards more meaningful measures of political reconciliation between the two countries. 
Thus, practical ways to cope with this very low sympathy and “warm up” the peace should 
be considered. One prevalent device for improving relations and increasing sympathy 
between groups is structured contacts and encounters (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998).  
Contact interventions have been shown as effective in creating more positive mutual 
relations also in the specific context of Jewish-Arab relations (Salomon, 2006). In line with 
this, since the signing of the Oslo peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians, 
several dozen interventions of organized contacts between members of these two groups are 
conducted each year, and are still being conducted now even after the breakup of the peace 
process and through different phases of increased violence between the sides. These include 
encounters, dialogues and cooperative projects between school and university students, 
teachers, university professors, religious leaders, medical doctors, journalists etc. (Maoz, 
2004). Moreover, problem-solving workshops between Israelis and Palestinians have been 
conducted since the 1970s by Herbert Kelman and his colleagues and have shown to 
increase understanding and readiness for reconciliation in both sides (Kelman, 1999).  
However, the signing of peace treaty between Israel and Jordan was not followed by 
such initiatives. As a result, there exist very few to nearly no organized contacts between 
Israelis and Jordanians (one rare exception is the “Crossing Borders” project that includes 
Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian youth). Consistently with this, our survey data indicates 
that only a small percentage (23%) of Israeli-Jews has ever met a Jordanian, while the 
majority of respondents (77%) reported that they have never met one). This variable of 
“meeting a Jordanian” was also found to be significantly and positively correlated with the 
extent of sympathy towards Jordanians (r= .23, p< .001). Thus, it may be that the strategy 
of grassroots contacts and encounters, that is widely used in the context of the conflictual 
relations between Israeli-Jews and Palestinians should be also more extensively employed 
in the case of post-conflict relations between Israel and Jordan. Since contacts do have a 
role in creating sympathy (Bar-On, 2008), they may be even more required in such phases 
of “freezing peace” in order to enable further transition into political reconciliation. Given 
the fact that Israel has a much greater level of military and economic power, higher Israeli 
sympathy towards Jordanians can be a crucial factor in increasing support for further 
reconciliation between the two countries.  
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Table 1. Correlations, Means, Standard Deviations and Percentage of Support for 
Reconciliation Policy Items 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean SD Support Percentage 
1. Open Borders 1      2.65 .98 61.0% 
2. Joint Economic 
Institutions .53 1     2.98 .88 77.4% 
3. Joint Political  
Institutions .43 .54 1    2.54 .96 54.4% 
4. Curriculum 
Change .45 .42 .46 1   2.33 .99 44.0% 
5. Legal Measures 
against Incitement .27 .32 .23 .32 1  2.68 .92 60.0% 
6. Support for 
Political 
Reconciliation 
Scale 
.76 .77 .74 .74 .59 1 2.64 .68 58.2% 
Note. N = 823- 935 for all statistics. All correlations are significant ( p  < .01 two-tailed) . 
Support percentage is percentage of those rated 3 or 4 (“Support” or “Strongly support”) on 
a bi-directional 1 to 4 scale ranging from “Strongly object” to “Strongly support”.   
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Table 2. Means (Standard Deviations) of Scales of Animosity towards Jordanians  
 1 2 3 4 5 
Mean 
(SD) 
1. Appraisal of Arab 
Collective Threat (4) .63     
3.59 
(.82) 
2. Appraisal of Jordanian 
Collective Threat (2) .23*** .33    
2.65 
(.81) 
3. Hatred (2) .27*** .24*** .78   
1.67 
(.98) 
4. Sympathy (2) -.25*** -.22*** -.08** .68  
2.39 
(1.03) 
5. Support for Political 
Reconciliation   (5) -.43*** -27*** -.31*** .31*** .78 
2.64 
(.68) 
 
Note. N = 979-1000. Number of scale items appears in parenthesis near scale title. . 
Correlations in italics on diagonal are Cronbach Alphas of the corresponding scales.  
*p≤0.05  **p≤0.01  ***p≤0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
